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FORWARD INTO THE PAST: SPEECH 
INTERMEDIARIES IN THE TELEVISION 
AND INTERNET AGES 
GREGORY P. MAGARIAN
*
 
 0The world is collapsing around our ears, 
 0I turned up the radio, but I can’t hear it.1 
Communication constructs society. By speaking to, with, and among one 
another, people and groups build relationships that allow us all to live more 
fully, understand the world better, and govern ourselves collectively. As 
societies grow, expression and engagement become more challenging. The 
presence of more ideas, larger and more diverse potential audiences, and 
more powerful and remote institutions threatens to reduce communication 
to a futile exercise. Whatever normative goals different people and groups 
may want public discourse to serve, pursuing those goals gets harder. 
Communication in a society as big and complex as ours inevitably 
depends on intermediation. Speech intermediaries—institutional actors in 
the private sector that compile, channel, and deliver information on a mass-
cultural scale—variously ameliorate and deepen the social problems of 
communication. Speech intermediaries’ forms and qualities become crucial 
determinants of how well public discourse will serve people’s and groups’ 
interests and what sort of society our communication will construct. 
In the period before the internet, what I’ll call the Television Age, speech 
intermediaries became increasingly consolidated, commanding, and 
homogeneous. The three national television networks, along with the major 
radio stations, daily newspapers, major film studios, book publishers, and 
record labels, reserved large audiences for only a select few speakers. 
Those institutions obstructed the path to a more contentious, participatory 
ideal of public discourse. Government and the public managed to exert 
substantial control over speech intermediaries through regulations and 
norms. Most of those external controls, however, reinforced intermediaries’ 
homogenizing tendencies. In the Television Age, free speech values—
conventionally understood to include individual self-fulfillment, the pursuit 
of truth, and effective democracy—suffered under speech intermediaries’ 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, Washington University in St. Louis. Thanks to the editors of the 
Oklahoma Law Review for organizing a fantastic symposium; to the symposium participants, 
especially my co-panelists Joe Thai and Sonja West; and to workshop participants at the 
Washington University School of Law. 
 1. R.E.M., Radio Song, on OUT OF TIME (Warner Bros. Records 1991). 
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sometimes oppressive power. In particular, Television Age intermediation 
stifled what I’ll call dynamic engagement: communication about varied 
ideas among people with divergent identities and perspectives.  
The internet, when it emerged as a social and cultural force in the 1990s, 
seemed to promise an undreamed age of effective mass communication 
without intermediation. People and groups could suddenly communicate 
with large audiences quickly and inexpensively. Today, many more people 
exchange much more information than anyone could have imagined even 
twenty-five years ago. Increasingly, however, online communication carries 
a familiar aftertaste. Powerful new intermediaries have emerged to undercut 
the internet’s autonomous, democratizing promise. Internet service 
providers (ISPs) dictate the terms on which information and users travel 
online. Search engines decide what sources fill our thirst for knowledge. 
Social media platforms determine with whom we engage and how. 
Unlike Television Age speech intermediaries, the new intermediaries of 
the Internet Age operate substantially free of effective regulatory or 
normative controls. Their role in structuring public discourse reflects no 
interest beyond their profit motives. The 2016 presidential election revealed 
deep pathologies of online mass communication and the new speech 
intermediation that structures it. The internet widens political divisions into 
volcanic fissures. The term “fake news” has exploded into our national 
lexicon, even as political opponents squabble about which news is fake. We 
decry opinion bubbles even as we luxuriate within them. ISPs, search 
engines, and social media platforms seem robust in pursuing profit but 
anemic in recognizing any broader social goal. Where Television Age 
intermediaries promoted homogeneity at a high cost to dynamic 
engagement, Internet Age intermediaries promote social fragmentation at a 
high cost to social cohesion. 
Our present social and political climate reveals a paradox about speech 
intermediation. On one hand, our riven political culture seems to lack, and 
to need, Television Age intermediaries’ function of substantially unifying 
society under a shared umbrella of cultural and political information. Critics 
of Television Age speech intermediaries’ homogenizing force never 
imagined a world where neighbors would lose any frame of reference for 
one another’s ways of thinking. We need stronger speech intermediation! 
On the other hand, Internet Age intermediaries have played a major role in 
degrading public discourse. ISPs blithely open platforms to hateful and 
mischievous speakers; search engines steer people toward micro-targeted 
informational niches; social media platforms bind us in cultural and 
political cocoons. We need weaker speech intermediation! 
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The paradox of Internet Age speech intermediation makes this a useful 
moment for considering what the experience of Television Age 
intermediation might teach us about our present situation. As private actors, 
speech intermediaries bear no First Amendment obligations while, in 
theory, enjoying substantial First Amendment protections against regulatory 
constraints. Television Age law and politics, however, managed to impose 
social obligations on intermediaries. The Television Age experience 
provides a template for imposing social obligations on the new speech 
intermediaries. At the same time, the homogenizing excesses of Television 
Age intermediation and regulation underscore the urgency of harnessing 
Internet Age intermediaries to strike a healthier balance between dynamic 
engagement and social cohesion. 
I. Speech Intermediation in the Television Age 
Speech intermediation is inevitable and necessary in large, complex 
societies.
2
 Speech intermediaries, however, can vary greatly in their 
characteristics and social effects. Here I describe and critique the conditions 
of speech intermediation in the Television Age. The technology and profit 
motives of Television Age speech intermediaries imposed prohibitive costs 
for all but a few speakers to reach mass audiences. A combination of 
government regulations and social pressures largely reinforced Television 
Age intermediaries’ tendency to structure public discourse in ways that 
promoted homogeneity while limiting the ranges of ideas and participants 
in public discourse. 
A. Intermediaries and the Limits of Television Age Public Discourse 
The popularization of radio broadcasting in the 1930s began what we can 
call the Mass Media Era, which encompasses the Television and Internet 
Ages. The Mass Media Era is defined by the use of information technology 
to make the same content broadly available to audiences throughout the 
United States. The federal government chose to make broadcasting a 
private enterprise structured by public licensure.
3
 That choice, placing 
broadcasters on the private side of the public-private divide, had important 
                                                                                                                 
 2. See, e.g., ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION: HOW THE INTERNET IS 
PUTTING INDIVIDUALS IN CHARGE AND CHANGING THE WORLD WE KNOW 187–88 (1999) 
(advocating careful selection and limited oversight of “trusted intermediaries”). Although 
the issues discussed in this Essay know no borders, my discussion focuses on the United 
States. 
 3. See Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as 
amended at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2012)). 
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consequences for First Amendment law. Similar consequences attended 
other sorts of speech intermediaries that emerged in the private sphere. 
The three national broadcast television networks became the dominant 
institutions on the mass media landscape from the 1950s into the 1990s. 
Most people during that time got the bulk of their news and entertainment 
from the networks.
4
 All three networks followed very similar programming 
approaches and practices, resulting in a high degree of similarity among 
their offerings.
5
 Local affiliates offered some finer-grained distinctions, but 
the local stations’ affiliations with the networks ensured substantial national 
uniformity.
6
 Viewers could supplement the network and affiliate offerings 
by tuning in to one or two local ultra-high-frequency (UHF) stations, but 
those stations offered little original programming, and their market shares 
were limited.
7
 Even the nominally government-run Public Broadcasting 
System operated on a national network model.
8
 
The broadcast television networks dominated the news industry. Local 
affiliates typically ran half-hour primetime newscasts that focused on local 
stories, followed immediately by the networks’ half-hour national news 
programs.
9
 As late as 1993, seventy-seven percent of Americans watched 
local television news broadcasts and sixty percent watched nightly network 
news broadcasts.
10
 Adding to the uniformity of news sources, the networks 
distinguished themselves primarily through the personalities of their 
                                                                                                                 
 4. See Amanda Lotz, What Is U.S. Television Now?, 625 ANNALS AMER. ACAD. POL. & 
SOC. SCI., Sept. 2009, at 51–52 (“Program options for viewers were limited to the offerings 
of the three national networks . . . . Minimal choice and control characterized our viewing 
experience compared with subsequent technological innovations and the modes of 
engagement they allowed.”) 
 5. See id. at 52 (“All three networks generally pursued the same strategy, so despite the 
appearance of competition, little differentiated the programs arising at any particular time.”). 
 6. See Marc Gunther, The Transformation of Network News: How Profitability Has 
Moved Networks Out of Hard News, NIEMAN REPS., June 15, 1999, http://niemanreports.org/ 
articles/the-transformation-of-network-news/. 
 7. See id.  
 8. See Meredith C. Hightower, Beyond Lights and Wires in a Box: Ensuring the 
Existence of Public Television, 3 J.L. POL’Y 133, 147 (1994). 
 9. See Gunther, supra note 6. 
 10. See Where Americans Go for News, PEW RES. CTR. (June 8, 2004), http://www. 
people-press.org/2004/06/08/i-where-americans-go-for-news/. That network number almost 
certainly understates the dominance of broadcast network news earlier in the Television 
Age, as the same study shows that thirty-five percent of Americans by 1993 were getting 
news from the Cable News Network (CNN). 
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overwhelmingly white, male news anchors.
11
 They almost never presented 
different ideological perspectives, demographic identities, or subject matter 
expertise.
12
 Viewers’ newscast preferences didn’t materially alter what 
information they got. The emergence of CNN in 1980 became a watershed 
in the late Television Age, marking a shift toward the more varied channel 
offerings of cable systems. CNN revolutionized television news by 
covering stories constantly, like all-news radio stations.
13
 But CNN offered 
no more substantive diversity than the three broadcast networks.
14
 Not until 
the right-wing Fox News debuted in 1996 did any television news outlet 
present a distinctive identity. 
Newspapers and radio substantially tracked the homogenizing path of 
network television. Where a large city in 1950 might have had three or four 
thriving daily newspapers with competing formats, ideologies, and 
strengths, by 1990 that number would have fallen to two or even one, and 
national chains rather than local owners increasingly owned the survivors.
15
 
Readers could get, at best, two counterpoised partisan takes on the day’s 
events.
16
 The debut of USA Today in 1982 created a print analogue to the 
national broadcast networks, forcing local newspapers to compete against a 
verbally arid, visually appealing national paper.
17
 Deregulation of 
ownership rules for radio stations through the late Television Age let a 
small number of companies control a large number of stations throughout 
the country.
18
 Under the technological and commercial shadow of 
television, then, both the newspaper and radio industries became more like 
                                                                                                                 
 11. See JONATHAN M. LADD, WHY AMERICANS HATE THE MEDIA AND HOW IT WORKS 
66–68 (2012). 
 12. See id. 
 13. See Harold L. Erickson, Cable News Network, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Cable-News-Network (last visited May 10, 2018). 
 14. See id. 
 15. See, e.g., BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE NEW MEDIA MONOPOLY 120–22 (2004) 
(discussing the decrease in the number of daily newspapers and the increase in chain 
ownership). 
 16. See id. 
 17. See Christine A. Varney, Dynamic Competition in the Newspaper Industry, 
NEWSPAPER ASS’N OF AM. (Mar. 21, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/dynamic-
competition-newspaper-industry. 
 18. See Robert Ekelund, Jr., et al., Market Power in Radio Markets: An Empirical 
Analysis of Local and National Concentration, 43 J.L. & ECON. 157, 157 (2000) 
(“[Deregulation] significantly relaxed local and national ownership restrictions, leading to a 
string of multi-million-dollar mergers in the radio industry. The structure of radio markets, 
once forcefully fragmented to a great extent, is now characterized by increasing levels of 
concentration.” (footnote omitted)). 
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television: less idiosyncratic, more national, with fewer owners providing 
more uniform content.  
Other sorts of speech intermediaries likewise followed the broadcast 
pattern. Accelerating concentrations of ownership in the production and 
distribution of books, movies, and music yielded shrinking numbers of 
increasingly dominant market actors.
19
 Bookstores provide a dramatic 
example of this trend. Starting in the 1970s and persisting through the 
1990s, large chains, notably Borders and Barnes & Noble, came to 
dominate the bookselling marketplace.
20
 The American Booksellers 
Association, which represents the interests of independent bookstores, lost 
more than two-thirds of its membership between 1971 and 1995, shrinking 
from 5200 bookstores to 1702.
21
 Such contractions limited opportunities for 
authors, filmmakers, and musicians to reach audiences. Opening a 
bookstore or starting a record label entails a substantially lower cost of 
entry than securing a broadcast license and building a network of television 
stations.
22
 Even so, independent publishers and sellers faced ever-deepening 
struggles to compete for audience attention with their much larger 
competitors.
23
 Consolidation in the cultural production and distribution 
spheres left audiences with fewer avenues for accessing cultural expression. 
Various other speech intermediaries helped to shape public discourse in 
the Television Age. One example, related to but distinct from this Essay’s 
central story, is the intermediation of political debate by the Democratic and 
Republican parties. Much like the broadcast networks and daily 
newspapers, the major parties funneled political discussion toward a narrow 
set of widely shared alternatives.
24
 As such, the parties mirrored the 
homogenizing function of other Television Age speech intermediaries. The 
major parties still dominate the electoral structure of the Internet Age, but 
their influence over political debate has waned parallel to the decline of 
other Television Age intermediaries. 
                                                                                                                 
 19. See, e.g., ANDRE SCHIFFRIN, THE BUSINESS OF BOOKS: HOW THE INTERNATIONAL 
CONGLOMERATES TOOK OVER PUBLISHING AND CHANGED THE WAY WE READ (2000). 
 20. See LAURA MILLER, RELUCTANT CAPITALISTS: BOOKSELLING AND THE CULTURE OF 
CONSUMPTION (2006). 
 21. Paul Collins, Chain Reaction, VILLAGE VOICE (May 16, 2006), https://www. 
villagevoice.com/2006/05/16/chain-reaction-2/. 
 22. See Jonah Engel Bromwich, What It Takes to Open a Bookstore, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 
29, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/29/nyregion/bookstores-opening.html. 
 23. See id. 
 24. For a discussion of the major parties’ dulling of political discourse and stifling of 
electoral competition, see Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Politics as Markets: 
Partisan Lockups of the Democratic Process, 50 STAN. L. REV. 643 (1998). 
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Television Age speech intermediaries were private companies that 
existed to pursue profit. The dominant mass media depended substantially 
on advertising revenue for their bottom lines.
25
 Advertising provided 
essentially all the revenue for television and radio broadcasters, while 
newspapers drew on a combination of advertising, subscriptions, and 
newsstand sales.
26
 Not until the advent of pay television in the cable era did 
television and radio diversify their revenue streams by charging users.
27
 The 
importance of advertising for Television Age speech intermediaries 
complicated their pursuit of profits, tying their content decisions not only to 
their autonomous self-interest but also to the varied interests of their 
sponsors. 
B. The Social-Structuring Function of Television Age Intermediaries: 
Regulation, Public Norms, and Homogeneity 
Beyond their profit motives, Television Age speech intermediaries 
played an important role in structuring public discourse and social 
relationships.
28
 By dictating, and limiting, the range of information 
available to audiences and of opportunities for speakers to reach audiences, 
the broadcast networks and other intermediaries strongly encouraged a high 
degree of homogeneity. To some extent that effect simply reflected the 
limited number of intermediaries that prevailing technological and 
economic conditions enabled. In addition, Television Age intermediaries’ 
social-structuring function complemented their profitmaking function in 
various ways. For example, the broadcast networks’ avoidance of partisan 
identities likely optimized their mass appeal and thus their revenues. 
Intermediaries’ social-structuring function, however, often diverged from 
their profit motives, mainly because external forces helped dictate how 
intermediaries performed that function.  
1. Federal Regulation 
The strongest external driver of speech intermediaries’ social-structuring 
function in the Television Age was federal regulation. Under a conventional 
understanding of constitutional law, media companies are speakers with 
                                                                                                                 
 25. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, ADVERTISING AND A DEMOCRATIC PRESS (1994). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. 
 28. On the relationship between social structure and public discourse, with particular 
attention to the role of government in regulating speech intermediaries, see OWEN M. FISS, 
LIBERALISM DIVIDED 7–30 (1996). 
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First Amendment rights.
29
 In the Television Age, however, the U.S. 
government imposed substantial public interest regulations on the most 
powerful, socially influential speech intermediaries: the broadcast media.
30
 
The Supreme Court validated, against First Amendment challenges, two 
forms of substantive broadcast regulation, while a distinct class of 
structural regulations never faced any noteworthy First Amendment 
challenge. 
From the beginning of broadcast licensing, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) imposed a substantive bar on broadcasting certain 
content presumed to be morally objectionable.
31
 The Burger Court upheld 
these “decency” regulations against a radio broadcaster’s First Amendment 
challenge.
32
 The Court rested its decision in large part on broadcast media’s 
social influence—what the Court called the “uniquely pervasive presence” 
of broadcast programming.
33
 A plainer account of speech intermediaries’ 
social-structuring function, and a more robust defense of government 
efforts to direct that function toward homogeneity, is hard to imagine. The 
decency regulations subjected every precinct of our morally diverse society 
to a common, restrictive conception of “decency” through our most 
powerful media. In industries like movies and music, where official 
decency regulations would have presented clearer First Amendment 
problems, governmental and societal pressure encouraged implementation 
of “voluntary” rating systems.34 
In addition, the Warren Court upheld the federal government’s “fairness 
doctrine,” which required broadcasters to offer public affairs programming 
with some balance in the points of view presented.
35
 In particular, Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC let the government impose on broadcasters a right 
of reply for subjects of on-air criticisms.
36
 The Burger Court took exactly 
the opposite view of a similar right-of-reply regulation that a state 
government imposed on the more established, less powerful newspaper 
                                                                                                                 
 29. Mark S. Nadel, A Technology Transparent Theory of the First Amendment and 
Access to Communications Media, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 157, 158 (1991). 
 30. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Television and the Public Interest, 88 CAL. L. REV. 
499 (2000). 
 31. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978). 
 32. Id. at 751. 
 33. Id. at 748. 
 34. See, e.g., Matt Blitz, A Brief History of the Movie Ratings System, GIZMODO (Dec. 
30, 2014), https://gizmodo.com/a-brief-history-of-the-movie-rating-system-1676334900. 
 35. See generally Gregory P. Magarian, Substantive Media Regulation in Three 
Dimensions, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 845 (2008). 
 36. 395 U.S. 367, 400 (1969). 
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industry.
37
 The Burger Court, however, continued to approve legislative 
access mandates to the broadcast media,
38
 even as the Justices scuttled any 
hope Red Lion might have offered for constitutionally mandated access 
rights.
39
 Then, as the Television Age wound down, the Rehnquist Court in 
the Turner Broadcasting case declined to extend Red Lion to cable 
television, though Turner still upheld a form of access regulation for cable 
providers on the understanding that the regulation was content neutral.
40
 
The most common account of Red Lion inters the case with the historical 
anomaly of the finite broadcast spectrum.
41
 The decision’s discussion of 
spectrum scarcity offers support for that account.
42
 At a deeper level, 
though, spectrum scarcity in Red Lion was merely an element in 
broadcasting’s social importance and power. Justice White’s majority 
opinion considered the public’s interest in getting diverse perspectives from 
the broadcast media to be a matter of constitutional weight. He emphasized 
“the First Amendment goal of producing an informed public capable of 
conducting its own affairs” and found “no sanctuary in the First 
Amendment for unlimited private censorship operating in a medium not 
open to all.”43 Lee Bollinger contends that broadcasting warranted different 
constitutional treatment than print media as a matter of pragmatic legal 
diversification, treating one mass medium differently from others.
44
 The 
government appears to have chosen broadcasting to bear greater public 
burdens, and the Court appears to have validated that choice, specifically 
because broadcasting was the most powerful, most socially important mass 
medium. 
                                                                                                                 
 37. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). 
 38. See CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 396 (1981) (rejecting a broadcast network’s 
First Amendment challenge to a federal requirement that broadcasters make advertising time 
available to national political candidates). 
 39. See CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 121 (1973) (rejecting 
political groups’ First Amendment challenge to a broadcast network’s refusal to sell them 
advertising time). 
 40. See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner I), 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (deciding to 
review under intermediate scrutiny a First Amendment challenge to the FCC’s requirement 
that cable operators “must carry” among their channel offerings local affiliates of the 
broadcast networks); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC (Turner II), 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997) 
(rejecting the First Amendment challenge and upholding the “must carry” regulations). 
 41. See, e.g., Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Decline of the Technology-Specific 
Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 266–91 (2003) (critiquing the scarcity 
rationale and associating its demise with the defeat of the Red Lion doctrine). 
 42. See Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 389–90 (1969). 
 43. Id. at 392. 
 44. See LEE C. BOLLINGER, IMAGES OF A FREE PRESS (1991). 
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The fairness doctrine mandated access to the broadcast airwaves for 
more speakers. In general, access mandates aim to increase participation in 
public debate and broaden the ranges of ideas available to audiences.
45
 
Access mandates thus cut against homogeneity and toward greater 
dynamism in public debate. The fairness doctrine in practice, however, 
presumed that public controversies present only two opposing sides, and it 
compelled airing of the second side only when a broadcaster chose to air 
the first. Moreover, the doctrine imposed this binary conception of public 
debate on all broadcasters alike, thereby discouraging divergences among 
broadcast stations even as it encouraged diversity within the stations’ 
programming. The doctrine likely made the airwaves more vibrant and 
public spirited than broadcasters would have on their own, but its limited, 
bounded model fell short of promoting a truly dynamic public discourse. 
In addition to the substantive decency and diversity regulations, federal 
regulators in the Television Age imposed on the broadcast media major 
structural regulations, some of which affected the print media as well. 
Structural regulations deal not with the content of speech but with 
conditions of media ownership.
46
 Television Age structural regulations 
included limits on ownership concentration, such as the federal bar on 
cross-ownership of newspapers and television stations in the same market.
47
 
Other structural regulations required a modicum of racial diversity in 
broadcast licensure.
48
 These regulations never inspired serious First 
Amendment challenges in the Television Age, likely because ownership 
rules fit comfortably within the Supreme Court’s post-Lochner allowance 
for government regulation of economic matters in the public interest.
49
  
                                                                                                                 
 45. See generally Gregory P. Magarian, Market Triumphalism, Electoral Pathologies, 
and the Abiding Wisdom of First Amendment Access Rights, 35 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1373 
(2007). 
 46. For extensive analysis of media ownership concentration and regulatory responses, 
see BAGDIKIAN, supra note 15; C. EDWIN BAKER, MEDIA CONCENTRATION AND DEMOCRACY: 
WHY OWNERSHIP MATTERS (2007) [hereinafter BAKER, CONCENTRATION]. 
 47. Jerome A. Barron, Structural Regulation of the Media and the Diversity Rationale, 
52 FED. COMM. L.J. 555, 555 (2000). 
 48. See Blake D. Morant, Democracy, Choice, and the Importance of Voice in 
Contemporary Media, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 943, 967–74 (2004) (discussing the history of 
broadcast regulations that mandate demographic diversity). 
 49. Compare Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905) (imposing substantive due 
process constraints on economic regulations), with Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 538 
(1934) (overruling Lochner to a substantial extent and vindicating broad government power 
to regulate the economy). 
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Structural regulations of Television Age intermediaries diverged from 
substantive regulations in the sort of influence they exerted on public 
discourse. Where substantive regulations largely reinforced Television Age 
intermediaries’ promotion of homogeneity, structural regulations by their 
nature encourage diversification and dynamic engagement. Television Age 
intermediaries limited the range of speakers and ideas in public discourse, 
but structural regulations at least ensured greater variety in who controlled 
the communications infrastructure. 
2. Normative Constraints and the “Public Trust” Conception of Speech 
Intermediation 
Beyond, and behind, government regulation of Television Age speech 
intermediaries, public norms imbued intermediaries, particularly the news 
media, with obligations to the people. The notion of the news media as the 
“fourth estate,” an essential check on government power, exerted great 
influence during this period, as manifest in Vincent Blasi’s theory that the 
First Amendment empowers the news media to check abuses of government 
power.
50
  
The fourth estate idea echoes through key First Amendment decisions of 
the Television Age Supreme Court. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, widely 
seen as the most important free speech case of the Television Age, limited 
defamation liability for criticisms of government officials.
51
 More 
pointedly, the Court in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn ascribed to the 
news media a responsibility to report accurately and robustly on 
government actions.
52
 The Court during this period also found a qualified 
First Amendment right of media access to criminal proceedings
53
 and let the 
news media encroach significantly on the federal government’s national 
security prerogatives.
54
 These decisions embodied not any precise 
constitutional command, but rather a normative premise that the news 
media bore a public trust to inform the people about their government and 
thus needed special First Amendment protections. 
Reflecting this “public trust” idea, media outlets during the Television 
Age also imposed substantial constraints on their own operations by 
                                                                                                                 
 50. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 2 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 521, 565–66 (1977). 
 51. 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964). 
 52. 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975). 
 53. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980). 
 54. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
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adopting codes of journalistic ethics.
55
 Ethical codes issued from 
professional associations like the Society of Professional Journalists, the 
Radio-Television News Directors Association, and the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, as well as individual news outlets like the Associated 
Press and Gannett.
56
 The ethical code of what is now the Radio Television 
Digital News Association (RTDNA) shows some characteristic features of 
these charters. The RTDNA Code’s Guiding Principles begin with the 
statement: “Journalism’s obligation is to the public. Journalism places the 
public’s interest ahead of commercial, political and personal interests.”57 
The Code states a commitment to “ethical decision-making,” prominently 
including a duty to seek out divergent points of view on important stories.
58
 
The Code then states and develops principles that distinguish journalism 
from other forms of content: overriding commitments to truth and accuracy, 
independence and transparency, and accountability.
59
 
The normative conception of the news media as the fourth estate and the 
media’s embrace of ethical codes largely worked with substantive media 
regulations to promote uniformity in Television Age public discourse. The 
news media’s check on government power pushed against a kind of 
hegemony, and the RTDNA Code’s acknowledgement that “[f]or every 
story of significance, there are always more than two sides” 60 shows a 
greater appreciation for dynamism in public discourse than the fairness 
doctrine did. Still, the fourth estate idea institutionalizes the news media 
under one overarching model. News outlets all do fundamentally the same 
democratic job, under a contestable account of liberalism that treats 
government as distinctly threatening and the institutional media as 
appropriately positioned to counter the threat. Likewise, media ethical 
codes instantiate a common professional vision, under which news 
organizations deserve the public’s trust because they all adhere to a 
common behavioral template. The codes project, and the public comes to 
expect, a journalistic posture of neutrality and objectivity. That posture 
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 56. See id. 
 57. Code of Ethics, RADIO TELEVISION DIGITAL NEWS ASS’N, https://www.rtdna.org/ 
content/rtdna_code_of_ethics (last visited May 29, 2018). 
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 59. See id. 
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inclines journalistic inquiry and analysis toward viewpoints broadly 
accepted by social and political majorities.
61
  
The public trust conception of the broadcast media frayed in the 
deregulatory frenzy of the late Television Age. The Reagan-era FCC 
abolished the fairness doctrine.
62
 Acquisitions and changes in corporate 
control changed the cultures of the major television networks and 
diminished whatever commitment to the public interest the networks had 
previously internalized.
63
 Deregulation of media ownership began in the 
late Television Age and accelerated during the Internet Age,
64
 from the 
loosening of ownership limits in the 1996 Telecommunications Act
65
 to the 
Trump FCC’s freeing of companies to own newspapers and broadcast 
stations in the same media market.
66
 At the height of the Television Age, 
however, the public trust conception strongly influenced how speech 
intermediaries performed their social-structuring function.  
* * * 
Television Age speech intermediation combined several features that 
undermined free speech values: a prohibitive cost of entry for most 
speakers, concentrations of power over public discourse, and 
homogenization of information. Leading free speech theorists of the 
Television Age, particularly those concerned with the importance of robust 
political debate, voiced concerns about intermediation. Alexander 
Meiklejohn, the avatar of democracy-focused free speech theory, 
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condemned “the commercial radio” as unworthy of First Amendment 
protection.
67
 He couldn’t abide dominant intermediaries that failed to 
present a diverse range of ideas about matters of public concern. Calls for 
rights of access to mass media reflect an even more acute critique of 
Television Age intermediaries’ power. Jerome Barron envisioned the mass 
media as a vehicle for widespread popular engagement in a multi-
directional conversation: not just diverse information but diverse 
participation.
68
 C. Edwin Baker subjected the mass media to the tools of 
political economy, showing how reliance on the free market to shape mass 
media content would inevitably underproduce the material required to 
satisfy either consumer preferences or democratic interests.
69
 
Television Age speech intermediaries were large, powerful institutions 
that generally limited the range of speakers and ideas in public discourse, 
diminishing opportunities for dynamic engagement. They functioned both 
to make profits and to structure society, and their social-structuring function 
reflected constraints imposed by federal regulations and public norms. The 
substance of those intermediaries’ social structuring was to promote a 
homogeneous public discourse that shortchanged free speech values. We 
can imagine (and some of us can remember) the daydream of Television 
Age intermediation’s critics: If only we could somehow develop an 
inexpensive form of mass communication that would afford many and 
varied speakers access to a broad and diverse audience. Then we wouldn’t 
let intermediary behemoths like the television networks flatten public 
discourse as the cost of effective mass communication. Then we could just 
talk to each other. 
Welcome to paradise. 
II. Speech Intermediation in the Internet Age 
The Internet Age dawned in the mid-1990s with prophecies of a free 
speech apotheosis: disintermediation. Libertarian Eugene Volokh predicted 
a regime of “cheap speech” that would shift power away from 
intermediaries.
70
 “Control over what is said and heard,” he asserted, “will 
shift from intermediaries—publishers, bookstore and music store owners, 
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and so on—to speakers and listeners themselves. Private parties will thus 
find it harder to use their market power to stifle speech.”71 Progressive Seth 
Kreimer celebrated “technologies of protest” that would give political 
dissidents an unprecedented capacity to reach audiences and mobilize 
support.
72
 Technological optimists generally believed the internet would 
both optimize personal autonomy and nurture a democratically fecund 
environment of diverse information.
73
 Striking down a ham-fisted 
congressional mandate of online “decency” in Reno v. ACLU, the Supreme 
Court inscribed cyberoptimism into law, hailing “the vast democratic 
forums of the Internet.”74  
The internet’s development has borne out some of the promise those 
early boosters celebrated. Disintermediation, however, has proved to be a 
fantasy. In the Internet Age, a new class of speech intermediaries, 
highlighted by ISPs, search engines, and social media platforms, has largely 
supplanted the intermediaries of the Television Age. Like the old speech 
intermediaries, the new intermediaries both make profits and structure 
society. In contrast to the Television Age, however, the new speech 
intermediaries’ profitmaking function dominates their social-structuring 
function. Internet technology greatly increases the range of potential social-
structuring outcomes from speech intermediation, but Internet Age law and 
politics have kept actual outcomes within the narrow boundaries of the new 
intermediaries’ self-interest. Regulation and social norms have done very 
little to influence how online intermediaries structure our public discourse. 
The substantive result of this arrangement sharply contrasts with the 
Television Age. Rather than making society more homogeneous, Internet 
Age intermediaries promote social fragmentation. 
A. Internet Age Intermediaries, Profit, and the Rise of Customized Truth 
The early cyberoptimists were substantially right to predict the decline of 
Television Age intermediaries. The broadcast networks have become a few 
islands, albeit big ones, in the enormous sea of broadband news and 
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entertainment. They no longer set the terms of mass culture. The largest 
U.S. radio holding company, a principal beneficiary of broadcast 
deregulation, recently filed for bankruptcy in an attempt to restructure 
billions of dollars in debt.
75
 The print editions of daily newspapers linger on 
life support.
76
 Venerable national and international brand names—The New 
York Times, The Wall Street Journal, CNN—retain prominence, but even 
those giants have shed staff amid major operational and commercial 
transformations.
77
 The political right has found a strident media voice 
through outlets of Television Age form like Fox News and the Sinclair 
Broadcast Group, but those outlets owe much of their success to broadband 
distribution and amplification, linking them to Internet Age fellow travelers 
like Breitbart and 4chan.
78
 
Amid the husks of the old speech intermediaries, powerful new ones 
have emerged. Online speech intermediaries control the technological 
infrastructure required for twenty-first century communication. They 
include entities as varied as the domain name system, backbone providers, 
and providers of application software.
79
 The most ubiquitous speech 
intermediaries of the Internet Age include ISPs, which let users access the 
internet’s information systems; search engines, which sort through and 
organize the blizzard of information available online; and social media 
platforms, the most recent intermediaries to emerge in the Internet Age, 
which increasingly organize interpersonal connections.
80
 Unlike Television 
Age intermediaries, the new intermediaries enable, transmit, and amplify 
communication by and among a vast range of people, with very low entry 
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(2010). 
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https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss1/9
2018]    SPEECH INTERMEDIARIES IN THE TV & INTERNET AGES 253 
 
 
costs.
81
 The internet contains many more ideas and hosts many more 
speakers than any prior medium.
82
 At the same time, the internet depends 
on a technological infrastructure far larger, more complex, and more 
sophisticated than the infrastructure of broadcasting.
83
 Thus, as in the 
Television Age, a few extremely powerful companies dominate Internet 
Age speech intermediation.
 
 
The new speech intermediaries undermine free speech values in 
numerous ways. In consideration of speech intermediaries’ central role in 
facilitating online communication, Congress enacted § 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA), which grants “provider[s] or user[s] 
of . . . interactive computer service[s]” sweeping immunity from liability 
for harm caused by the speech they transmit or host.
84
 That immunity would 
seem to incentivize openness to varied content. Several factors, however, 
create contrary incentives for intermediaries to restrict speech. Just as 
government pressure in the Television Age encouraged movie studios and 
music labels to censor their output, government pressure in the Internet 
Age, usually based on national security concerns, enlists ISPs as 
secondhand regulators of their individual users.
85
 A potent incentive for 
intermediaries to censor speech arises from the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act’s immunization of ISPs from copyright infringement liability 
as long as they remove material the copyright holder identifies as 
infringing.
86
 Online speech intermediaries also face increasing public 
pressure to block content from neo-Nazis, white supremacists, and other 
hate groups.
87
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Stronger than external pressures to restrict speech is the internal pressure 
of the profit motive. ISPs sometimes seek to preempt controversy by 
censoring politically sensitive content, including antiwar messages and 
criticisms of the ISPs themselves or their commercial partners.
88
 More 
broadly, ISPs want the power to charge different rates for different kinds 
and grades of content and to deliver different access speeds to content 
providers based on their abilities to pay.
89
 The FCC during the Obama 
administration issued regulations that barred such differential treatment, 
establishing a legal principle of “net neutrality.”90 Under the Trump 
administration, the FCC has repealed the net neutrality regulations, freeing 
ISPs to discriminate with impunity in how they manage flows of data.
91
 
Search engines, like ISPs, play a crucial role in enabling online 
communication, and they accordingly exercise formidable power.
92
 Search 
engines’ proprietary algorithms for delivering results that satisfy users’ 
queries give them a marginally stronger prima facie case than ISPs for the 
proposition that they exercise a kind of editorial discretion. Search engines, 
however, have even deeper incentives than ISPs to compromise the free 
flow of information online. Selling prime positions in search results can 
bring potentially enormous profits.
93
 Sometimes search engines sell 
positions openly, through “sponsored” results.94 That designation at least 
provides transparency, although Google muddies the picture with tactics 
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like restricting availability of sponsored links for controversial political 
content.
95
 An even greater danger to open public discourse arises when 
search engines disguise bought results as unbiased. Search engines may 
also remove results altogether from their indexes or manipulate the rankings 
of results.
96
 Effective regulatory checks on these practices would require 
knowledge of search engines’ algorithms and other proprietary methods, 
but the search engine companies have strong profit incentives to protect 
their trade secrets. 
Social media platforms represent the next generation of online speech 
intermediaries. They establish systems and protocols to identify people with 
whom one will communicate and determine what sorts of communication 
one can share with those people, including short text, longer text, still 
images, and moving images. Some social media platforms exercise degrees 
of active control over content, as with YouTube’s varied tools for 
promoting certain videos.
97
 Social media’s negative consequences for free 
speech lie in the gulf between its limited expressive capacities and its users’ 
intense reliance on its services. Twitter’s cramped format (280 characters 
per Tweet, doubled from 140 in late 2017) truncates any possibility of 
thoughtful discussion.
98
 Facebook provides more space to explain ideas and 
positions, but its customized interface lets users surround themselves 
entirely with people who reinforce their social and political biases.
99
 
Sometimes social media platforms deliberately push falsehood and division, 
as with YouTube’s steering users toward sensationalist content through its 
“up next” feature.100 Some architects of social media have strongly 
condemned their creation’s corrosive effects on public discourse.101 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 14–17. 
 96. See id. at 12–14; Chandler, supra note 93, at 1109–11. 
 97. Chandler, supra note 93, at 1124. 
 98. See Robinson Meyer, 7 Questions About Twitter’s Doubled Character Limit, 
ATLANTIC (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/09/oh-
jack-dorsey-we-love-you-get-up/541203/. 
 99. See John Keegan, Blue Feed, Red Feed, WALL ST. J. (May 18, 2016), 
http://graphics.wsj.com/blue-feed-red-feed/ (showing stark differences in users’ exposure to 
information depending on their ideological identities). This “filter bubble” phenomenon 
affects search engines as well as social media. See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER 
BUBBLE (2011). 
 100. See Paul Lewis, “Fiction Is Outperforming Reality”: How YouTube’s Algorithm 
Distorts Truth, GUARDIAN (Feb. 2, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2018/ 
feb/02/how-youtubes-algorithm-distorts-truth. 
 101. See Mike Allen, Sean Parker Unloads on Facebook: “God Only Knows What It’s 
Doing to Our Children’s Brains,” AXIOS (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.axios.com/sean-
parker-unloads-on-facebook-god-only-knows-what-its-doing-to-our-childrens-brains-15133 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018
256 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:237 
 
 
The 2016 election starkly demonstrated social media’s power and 
pathologies. Users soaked up selective information, much of it manifestly 
false, from weaponized sources of what we can call customized truth. 
Facebook’s increasing dominance in news distribution multiplied the power 
of hyper-partisan websites, mainly on the right, and enabled the 
proliferation of verifiably fake news.
102
 The Russian government 
notoriously spread propaganda and disinformation on Facebook, and 
Russian “trolls” also manipulated Twitter, YouTube, and Instagram.103 The 
Internet Research Agency, a Russian company with Kremlin links, posted 
content on Facebook that reached twenty-nine million people, who then 
shared the posts with tens of millions more.
104
 The Internet Research 
Agency also posted over one million election-related tweets via automated 
Twitter accounts and created YouTube channels on which it uploaded over 
1000 videos.
105
 Topics included contentious issues from race and religion to 
gun regulation and LGBTQ+ rights.
106
 The Russians scattered posts and ads 
on both sides of these issues, exploiting political polarization to increase 
social fragmentation.
107
 To make matters worse, the right-wing data 
analytics company Cambridge Analytica, employed by the Trump 
campaign, illegally harvested tens of millions of U.S. Facebook profiles in 
order to target inflammatory political advertising at specific voters.
108
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While social media platforms often tout their capacities to democratize 
political communication, the 2016 election underscored their weaknesses—
particularly their inability to foster dynamic engagement.
109
 No ethos of 
civic or social responsibility impeded social media platforms from 
following their single-minded profit motive down a democratic sinkhole. 
B. Internet Age Intermediaries’ Social Structuring and Its Discontents 
In contrast to Television Age speech intermediaries, Internet Age 
intermediaries’ profitmaking self-interest fully subsumes and defines their 
social-structuring function. Law, politics, and technology have combined to 
prevent external constraints on the new intermediaries. We see no online 
analog to Television Age structural regulations of media ownership, let 
alone substantive regulations like the fairness doctrine. Net neutrality has 
set the high-water mark to date for government efforts to influence the new 
speech intermediaries. Public norms have failed to constrain social media 
platforms’ choices in the way the public trust idea constrained the 
Television Age news media.
110
 Internet Age speech intermediaries haven’t 
embraced anything like the journalistic ethical codes of the Television 
Age.
111
 At most, they attempt to placate public criticism by tweaking their 
algorithms and platforms in ways that do little for positive social 
structuring.
112
 Intermediaries’ profit motives deter them from focusing on 
the public good.
113
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Commentators during the early Internet Age offered prescient warnings 
that the capacity to tailor our online experiences to fit our preexisting 
preferences would fray the social fabric, dividing people with different 
beliefs and values.
 
Andrew Shapiro warned that news media without 
intermediation could, in the manner of Kurosawa’s Rashomon, yield a 
dizzying array of perspectives that would make actual states of affairs hard 
to discern.
114
 Personalization of information sources, what Cass Sunstein 
called “the Daily Me,” could lead to a paralyzing morass of polarized 
disagreements over basic truths.
115
 These early commentators tended to 
think the market, driven by user demands, would generate effective 
solutions to these problems.
116
 Our present media environment, notably the 
problems of filter bubbles, fake news, and manipulation of social media that 
plagued the 2016 election, bears out these commentators’ warnings while 
exposing the weakness of their laissez-faire prescriptions. Online 
intermediaries’ damaging effects on public discourse—notably, though not 
exclusively, their promotion of social fragmentation—have prompted calls 
for subjecting the new intermediaries to some degree of legal control. 
 Most reformers advocate scaling back present First Amendment doctrine 
to permit legislative and administrative regulation of online intermediaries. 
Jack Balkin, for example, advocates a free speech regime based on a mix of 
private sector initiatives and technocratic government oversight.
117
 In the 
Internet Age, he argues, protection of free speech values won’t depend on 
affirmative constitutional rights but rather on “the design of technological 
systems—code—and . . . legislative and administrative schemes of 
regulation, for example . . . open access requirements or the development of 
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encounters with unexpected information sources); Berman & Weitzner, supra note 73, at 
1626–29 (positing the internet’s “[d]ecentralized architecture” as a sufficient mechanism to 
fulfill democracy’s need for diverse information). Professor Sunstein showed some 
ambivalence about regulation. Compare SUNSTEIN, supra note 115, at 190–211 (arguing that 
mechanisms for encouraging individual Web sites to spur critical and civic engagement 
should be entirely voluntary), with Cass R. Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace, 
104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1795–1803 (1995) (advocating various legislative regulations of 
services that provide Internet access). 
 117. See Jack M. Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom 
of Expression for the Information Society, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 52–54 (2004). 
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compulsory license schemes in copyright law.”118 Several commentators 
contend that ISPs should be subject to regulation as common carriers.
119
 
This approach, embodied in net neutrality, would roughly extend the 
Supreme Court’s treatment of broadcasters in Red Lion and cable 
companies in Turner to ISPs. Advocates of legislative reform have 
proposed a range of regulatory strategies beyond net neutrality, including 
requirements that intermediaries disclose their methods for aggregating and 
presenting information
120
 and safeguards against intermediaries’ 
encroaching on users’ privacy121 and intellectual property.122  
Congress has given small indications that it might consider regulatory 
reform strategies to constrain online speech intermediaries. In the wake of 
the 2016 election, a bipartisan group of legislators sponsored a bill that 
would regulate online intermediaries like traditional media by making them 
disclose who pays for political advertisements.
123
 The Cambridge Analytica 
scandal has also led Congress to take a greater interest in social media 
firms’ data practices.124 
A more radical strategy for constraining the new speech intermediaries 
would fundamentally recast First Amendment law to give intermediaries 
affirmative constitutional obligations to promote free speech.
125
 Advocates 
of this approach view the internet as a communications environment in 
                                                                                                                 
 118. Id. at 54. 
 119. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 135–46; Sunstein, supra note 116, at 1798 
(suggesting that regulation of Internet access providers as common carriers wouldn’t violate 
the First Amendment); Tushnet, supra note 84, at 1010 (proposing common carrier 
regulation as one appropriate form of compensation for ISPs’ statutory immunity from 
liability for harms of the speech they transmit). 
 120. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 149–51; Chandler, supra note 93, at 1117–18. 
 121. See Jack M. Balkin, Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 49 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1183, 1185–87 (2016). 
 122. See Andrew Tutt, The New Speech, 41 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 235, 293–94 (2014). 
 123. See Steven T. Dennis, Senators Propose Social-Media Ad Rules After Months of 
Russia Probes, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 19, 2017), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/ 
2017-10-19/russia-probes-spur-lawmakers-on-election-security-social-media. 
 124. See, e.g., David Smith, Zuckerberg Put on Back Foot as House Grills Facebook 
CEO Over User Tracking, GUARDIAN (April 11, 2018), https://www.theguardian. 
com/technology/2018/apr/11/zuckerberg-hearing-facebook-tracking-questions-house-back-
foot. 
 125. See Goodman, supra note 90, at 1211–17; Yemini, supra note 90, at 1–7; see also 
NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 105 (contending that courts should treat ISPs as state actors). 
For an extended discussion of the tensions between affirmative constitutional proposals for 
access rights and constitutional allowances for access regulations, see Magarian, supra note 
45. 
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which multiple speech interests—of many and varied content providers, 
intermediaries, and audiences—routinely conflict. First Amendment 
doctrine should evolve to fit this new, complex communication ecosystem 
by recognizing net neutrality, and perhaps other structural and even 
substantive reforms, as mandatory preconditions for preserving expressive 
freedom in the Internet Age. “[T]he real justification for network 
neutrality,” contends Moran Yemini, “is content providers’, and especially 
users’, own individual free-speech rights, stemming directly from the First 
Amendment.”126 Such a bold shift in First Amendment doctrine would 
require—and its supporters encourage—openly normative judicial 
assessments of competing rights claims in challenges to structural 
regulations like net neutrality.
127
 In Ellen Goodman’s formulation, “where 
there truly are speech interests on both sides, the question [should be] 
whether the government intervention is actually pro-speech or anti-speech 
in ways that are constitutionally meaningful.”128 This affirmative 
constitutional approach to constraining intermediaries would invert, not just 
dodge, the barriers to reform erected by present First Amendment doctrine. 
III. Back to the Future 
Consideration of speech intermediation and its critics in the Television 
and Internet Ages provides raw material for thinking through some of the 
deepest challenges on our present communications landscape. In particular, 
this Essay’s discussion of old and new speech intermediaries sheds some 
light on the paradox of Internet Age speech intermediation. Many people 
simultaneously believe that online intermediaries have too much power, 
because of the various ways they degrade public discourse, and that online 
speech needs stronger intermediation, because we’ve lost the relative unity 
that old media intermediaries enforced during the Television Age. Lessons 
from the Television Age suggest a two-part program for moving forward. 
First, we should create legal space for Internet Age analogs to the 
Television Age regulations that placed social policies above speech 
                                                                                                                 
 126. Yemini, supra note 90, at 38; see also MCCHESNEY, supra note 61, at 143–45 
(positing the necessity of net neutrality for the availability of quality journalism online). 
 127. I have advocated this sort of approach generally for cases that present conflicts 
between First Amendment interests. See Gregory P. Magarian, The Jurisprudence of 
Colliding First Amendment Interests: From the Dead End of Neutrality to the Open Road of 
Participation Enhancing Review, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 185, 185–91 (2007). 
 128. Goodman, supra note 90, at 1258. Professor Goodman advocates an analysis akin to 
rational basis review for content-neutral government regulations designed to enhance speech 
opportunities. See id. at 1256–61. 
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intermediaries’ profits. Second, we should push for Internet Age 
intermediaries’ structuring of public discourse to strike a healthy balance 
between the dynamic engagement we lacked in the Television Age and the 
social cohesion we increasingly lack now. 
A. First Amendment Law vs. Free Speech Principles 
Our substantive aspirations for public discourse in the Internet Age will 
either be borne on the wings or ground in the teeth of the First Amendment. 
A regulatory program that pushed intermediaries to promote a system of 
communication that served the public interest might stop at structural 
regulations like net neutrality, or it might proceed through some version of 
substantive regulation. Whatever form such a program took, some 
intermediaries would insist it transgressed First Amendment boundaries. 
Those boundaries, as a general matter, do valuable work. They embody a 
well-grounded presumption that substantive government regulations of 
speech are usually too ill-motivated or ill-conceived to permit.
129
 Should 
that insight leave any room for regulation of the new speech intermediaries? 
Both opponents and advocates of greater legal constraints on Internet 
Age speech intermediaries agree that prevailing, libertarian First 
Amendment doctrine presents strong—perhaps impregnable—barriers 
against most approaches to regulating intermediaries.
130
 Conventional First 
Amendment doctrine, constrained by the state action principle that grounds 
most constitutional rights, refuses to confront conflicts between speech 
interests. Like an old formula Western, the doctrine requires a good guy and 
a bad guy: a putatively censored speaker and the putatively censorious 
government. The rigid, parallel distinctions of public from private and of 
censors from speakers have always limited First Amendment law’s 
responsiveness to speech controversies and distorted how legal doctrine 
reflects the values that animate constitutional speech protection.
131
 First 
Amendment law insulates speech intermediaries to pursue profit while 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY (1982). 
 130. See Chandler, supra note 93, at 1124–29 (evaluating against First Amendment 
concerns various proposals for regulating intermediaries); Tutt, supra note 122, at 272–86 
(discussing elements of First Amendment doctrine that impede intermediary regulation); 
Yemini, supra note 90, at 13–32 (same); Christopher S. Yoo, Free Speech and the Myth of 
the Internet as an Unintermediated Experience, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 697, 697–703 
(2010) (praising present First Amendment doctrine as a barrier to regulations of speech 
intermediaries). 
 131. See Magarian, supra note 127, at 191–93; Gregory P. Magarian, The First 
Amendment, the Public-Private Distinction, and Nongovernmental Suppression of Wartime 
Political Debate, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 101, 135–146 (2004). 
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shielding them from social obligations. That’s why Television Age critics 
of speech intermediation sought to move First Amendment doctrine in a 
direction that would allow greater regulation of intermediaries
132
 or 
affirmatively subject them to constitutional free speech obligations.
133
 
Those critics saw the need to change First Amendment law in order to 
promote free speech values. 
The contrast between Miami Herald v. Tornillo and Red Lion reveals an 
apparent distinction the Television Age Supreme Court drew between 
newspapers’ axiomatic editorial integrity and broadcasters’ more crassly 
commercial priorities.
134
 No one ever denied, however, that broadcasters, 
by creating and disseminating content, were speakers in some important 
sense. It’s hard to find the same expressive character in Comcast, Google, 
or Facebook. These new intermediaries all convey information, but 
autonomous third parties—individual users and creators—produce the 
information the intermediaries convey.
135
 Most online intermediaries don’t 
even actively select those users and creators, as cable systems select 
channels.
136
 Rather, the new intermediaries flourish by making their 
services generally available.
137
 “The very term ‘intermediaries,’ as opposed 
to ‘the press,’” notes Rebecca Tushnet, “emphasizes that aggregators, 
compilers, and other more passive conduits are not themselves the source of 
speech.”138 First Amendment interests of online intermediaries generally 
derive from the interests of their users. Granting First Amendment 
protection to intermediated online speech presents little problem when 
intermediaries and their users stand in common cause against government 
efforts to censor speech that the users make or seek and the intermediaries 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See, e.g., BAKER, MEDIA, supra note 61, at 63. 
 133. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 68, at 1662–63. 
 134. Compare 418 U.S. 241 (1974) with 395 U.S. 367 (1969). 
 135. See NUNZIATO, supra note 86, at 114. 
 136. See id. at 115. 
 137. Online intermediaries vary substantially in how they organize, channel, and promote 
content. Thorough First Amendment analysis of any regulatory proposal would need to 
consider the particular attributes and practices of the regulated intermediaries. See, e.g., 
Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1670 (suggesting that the constitutionality of regulating 
intermediaries as common carriers might vary with different intermediaries’ degrees of 
editorial intervention in the content they carry). 
 138. Tushnet, supra note 84, at 988; see also Sullivan, supra note 71, at 1654. 
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carry.
139
 The situation changes dramatically when the interests of 
intermediaries and users diverge. 
Other commentators, however, have sought to bring ISPs within the First 
Amendment’s protection for intermediaries’ editorial discretion.140 For 
example, Jonathan Zittrain justifies strong First Amendment protections for 
online intermediaries by characterizing them as “content curators.”141 
Meanwhile, courts have strengthened the foundation for treating 
intermediaries as First Amendment speakers. While intermediaries have 
grown more powerful and harder to restrain, First Amendment doctrine has 
grown more formalistic in its reflexive concern for wealthy and privileged 
speakers.
142
 The “fourth estate” justification for imposing social obligations 
on the news media (whatever entities that category now includes) has gone 
the way of eight-track tapes.
143
 The hardening of the public-private 
distinction in First Amendment law presents a particularly rough thicket for 
reform efforts.
144
  
I have argued elsewhere that the Roberts Court’s version of First 
Amendment doctrine protects the speech interests of powerful, established 
institutions while letting the government restrict much speech from the 
social and political margins.
145
 This approach to the First Amendment, 
which I call “managed speech,” promotes a conservative ideal of social and 
political stability while stifling dynamism in public discourse.
146
 The Court 
doesn’t simply favor wealthy and powerful speakers and disfavor poor and 
marginal speakers; rather, it enlists the former as guardians of a social order 
threatened by the latter. Managed speech reinforces First Amendment 
doctrine’s preference for the interests of online speech intermediaries over 
                                                                                                                 
 139. An example of this scenario is a federal court’s recent holding that the President 
violated the First Amendment when he blocked Twitter followers who criticized him. See 
Knight First Amendment Institute v. Trump, No. 17 Civ. 5205 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2018). 
 140. See Yemini, supra note 90, at 17–20; Yoo, supra note 130, at 742–45. 
 141. Jonathan Zittrain, Facebook Could Decide an Election Without Anyone Ever 
Finding Out, NEW REPUBLIC (June 1, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117878/ 
information-fiduciary-solution-facebook-digital-gerrymandering. 
 142. See generally Julie E. Cohen, The Zombie First Amendment, 56 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1119 (2015). 
 143. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Judith Miller, 397 F. 3d 964, 968–72 (D.C. 
Cir. 2005) (taking a narrow view of journalists’ legal latitude to protect the identities of 
confidential sources). 
 144. See Tushnet, supra note 110, at 1667–72; Tutt, supra note 122, at 265–66. 
 145. See GREGORY P. MAGARIAN, MANAGED SPEECH: THE ROBERTS COURT’S FIRST 
AMENDMENT (2017). 
 146. See id. at xiv–xvi (introducing the managed speech conception of First Amendment 
jurisprudence). 
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those of individual users.
147
 Intermediaries are exactly the sort of 
formidable institutions whose speech interests the Roberts Court values 
most.
148
 This Court’s limited forays into new media First Amendment 
issues consistently resist government regulation.
149
 Down the road, 
however, online intermediaries’ promotion of social fragmentation could 
conceivably set managed speech’s methodology of empowering the 
powerful against its mission of reifying stability.  
The absence online of the spectrum scarcity often portrayed as animating 
Television Age broadcast regulations eliminates a conventional justification 
for imposing substantive regulations on speech intermediaries. The Internet 
Age, however, features its own scarcity.
150
 The proliferation of available 
information has exposed the importance of audience attention as a scarce 
resource in today’s system of free expression.151 Attention scarcity allows 
for the aggressive use of information overload as a tool for drowning out 
other speech.
152
 In addition, the Internet Age has continued—and even 
exacerbated—the Television Age pattern of concentrated intermediary 
ownership.
153
 Old media entities have carried their concentrations of 
ownership with them to the internet.
154
 As for the new speech 
intermediaries, the roster of dominant ISPs, search engines, and social 
media sites looks barely more extensive or diverse than the “big three” 
networks and other concentrated intermediaries of the Television Age. 
                                                                                                                 
 147. See MAGARIAN, supra note 145, at 227–53. 
 148. See id. at 252–53. 
 149. See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1732–33 (2017) (striking down 
a ban on registered sex offenders’ access to social media sites); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. 
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precondition for media regulation. Cf., e.g., Sunstein, supra note 116, at 1764–65 
(advocating a normative conception of First Amendment law without regard to spectrum 
scarcity).  
 151. See BAKER, CONCENTRATION, supra note 46, at 101–10 (analyzing audience 
concentration on the Internet); Ellen P. Goodman, Media Policy Out of the Box: Content 
Abundance, Attention Scarcity, and the Failure of Digital Markets, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
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 153. See BAKER, MEDIA, supra note 61, at 285–307; Tushnet, supra note 84, at 992–93; 
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 154. See BAKER, CONCENTRATION, supra note 46, at 111–12. 
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Despite the threats that attention scarcity and ownership concentration pose 
to free speech, we face a severe disconnect between what First Amendment 
doctrine permits and what a socially constructive account of free speech 
principles compels. 
We need a First Amendment doctrine that can advance a regime of 
speech intermediation to serve the public interest. The doctrinal path could 
lead in any of several directions.
155
 We could seek to persuade courts to 
impose affirmative First Amendment obligations on speech intermediaries. 
Alternatively, we could seek to persuade courts to construe the First 
Amendment as letting Congress and administrative agencies regulate 
intermediaries in public-regarding ways. Those regulations might focus on 
broad structural reforms. Recall how structural regulations in the Television 
Age distinctively countered intermediaries’ tendency to promote 
homogeneity. One familiar structural approach would be to treat 
intermediaries as common carriers, as the net neutrality principle treats 
ISPs. A different structural approach could invoke pro-competitive 
principles to subject dominant intermediaries to greater market 
competition,
156
 although economic qualities of the internet would pose 
substantial challenges to anti-monopolistic reforms.
157
 Alternatively, a 
substantive regulatory strategy might compel intermediaries to monitor 
content based on accuracy, privacy, or harm-based concerns. That sort of 
strategy could entail relaxing or ending online intermediaries’ CDA 
immunity. Whatever path we follow, if we want Internet Age speech 
intermediation not just to maximize private profit but to serve some 
conception of the public good, we need to rethink First Amendment 
doctrine. 
B. Reconciling Social Cohesion and Dynamic Engagement 
The profitmaking function of speech intermediation presents the same 
problems in the Internet Age that it presented in the Television Age. Speech 
intermediaries are private companies that exist to make money. From the 
perspectives of all but the most convinced right-wing libertarians, 
intermediaries’ profits are at best incidental and at worst contrary to 
society’s well-being. The early cyberoptimists were right to understand the 
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 156. Cf. STEVE COLL, THE DEAL OF THE CENTURY: THE BREAKUP OF AT&T (1988). 
 157. See, e.g., Neil W. Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from 
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internet’s technology as creating a far broader set of possibilities than the 
Television Age ever offered for how public discourse can work. We should 
maintain a healthy skepticism about the political and legal mechanisms by 
which we impose social obligations on intermediaries. However, we have 
good reasons to hope that the lessons of the past and the innovations of the 
present will help the Internet Age improve over the substantive results of 
regulating speech intermediaries in the Television Age. 
What kind of social structure should we aim for Internet Age speech 
intermediaries to promote? One of the abiding challenges of public 
discourse in a democratic society is to reconcile the values of social 
cohesion and dynamic engagement. Members of a community need 
common frames of reference to help them engage with one another and 
participate together in political and social processes. At the same time, 
democratic politics and societal progress depend on the ability and 
willingness of everyone in the community to question what we think we 
know.
158
 Social cohesion and dynamic engagement provide complementary 
benefits for public discourse. At the same time, the two values elementally 
conflict. Too much cohesion brings a stultifying conformity that can dull 
the critical edge of political debate. Conversely, an overly sensitive critical 
trigger can curdle dynamic engagement into nihilistic cynicism, corroding 
public discussion by preventing any meaningful consensus. 
Speech intermediation in the Television Age overvalued uniformity in 
public discourse at a steep cost to dynamic engagement. The broadcast 
television networks, along with other speech intermediaries, homogenized 
debate and flattened difference. The image of the world they beamed into 
everyone’s brains was oppressively white, aggressively male, reflexively 
middle class and gentile, and thoughtlessly straight and cisgender. Their 
politics congealed in a mushy center.  
People in the Television Age, of course, frequently disagreed with one 
another and assessed public issues critically. Most vividly, social 
movements against the Vietnam War, racial apartheid, and subordination of 
women forcefully challenged settled allocations of power. For the most 
part, however, efforts to destabilize prevailing ideas worked against the 
dominant speech intermediaries, not through them. We can be grateful that 
the internet’s technological infrastructure makes Television Age 
intermediaries’ pressure toward conformity impossible for online 
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intermediaries to replicate. Even so, our present vantage point suggests that 
Television Age critics may not have sufficiently valued the social 
responsibilities that period’s regulations and norms imposed on speech 
intermediaries. Journalistic standards and ethical codes, for instance, look 
very appealing in an age of fake news and filter bubbles. 
Our society has grown more contentious in the Internet Age for many 
reasons, some of them laudable. Today we have greater access to more 
information and a broader range of viewpoints, causing inevitable 
divergences between different people’s bases of knowledge. People divided 
by continents, with radically different cultural and political values, can 
engage or confront one another as easily as if they met across a backyard 
fence. Liberation movements have brought members of marginalized 
groups greater agency and autonomy, increasing social and cultural 
heterogeneity. The shift from the old to the new speech intermediaries has 
aided these positive developments by lowering entry costs into public 
discourse. Unfortunately, online intermediaries have also helped to erode 
social cohesion in less beneficent ways, mainly by accelerating the 
customization of truth. The Internet Age indulges biases to virtually no 
end—or to no virtual end. 
Even as the customization of truth weakens social cohesion, it 
simultaneously garbles dynamic engagement. When you live in an echo 
chamber, you lose any reason to believe you might be wrong. You therefore 
lose any motive to interrogate your beliefs. Customized truth creates false 
certainty. People who get most of their knowledge from their like-minded 
friends and followers on Facebook and Twitter may forget how to look for 
other sides of a story. At worst, we become susceptible to an absurd degree 
of faith in the public figures and ideas that we’ve favored all along and an 
automatic willingness to believe the worst about the people and ideas we’ve 
opposed. Customized truth makes sense from a commercial standpoint: the 
ability to micro-target goods and services based on preexisting preferences 
is great for business. It’s not so great for democracy. 
Comparison of Television and Internet Age speech intermediation should 
reassure us that both epochs’ critics had sound reasons for their contrasting 
complaints. The expressive infrastructure of the Mass Media Era has never 
delivered a healthy balance between social cohesion and dynamic 
engagement. The Television Age overvalued uniformity; the Internet Age 
has degraded both qualities. Reasonable (and unreasonable) people will, of 
course, disagree normatively about where the optimal balance falls. The 
problem is sufficiently abstract and complex to make it very difficult. The 
importance of the outcome justifies the effort. 
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Conclusion 
Speech intermediation will always be necessary in our massive, complex, 
diverse society. The essential questions about speech intermediaries are 
what shapes they’ll take under different social and technological conditions 
and in which directions they’ll move public discourse. In the Television 
Age, speech intermediaries were huge, concentrated institutions that kept 
most speakers from mass audiences and pushed society toward numbing 
conformity. Law and public norms regulated and influenced intermediaries’ 
behavior in ways that generally exacerbated their homogenizing tendencies. 
In the Internet Age, intermediaries are huge, concentrated institutions that 
give many speakers access to mass audiences and push society toward 
chaotic fragmentation. We indulge their profit-motivated autonomy in ways 
that let them degrade social cohesion and dynamic engagement all at once. 
One key difference between Television Age and Internet Age speech 
intermediation is the content of First Amendment law. Our retreat from 
regulation has something to do with the technological qualities of online 
speech intermediaries, but it also has a lot to do with a doctrine that has 
shifted toward an overbearing solicitude for powerful institutions. If we 
want intermediaries to serve the public good, then we need to change First 
Amendment law, whether incrementally to permit regulation of 
intermediaries or radically to compel them to promote free speech values. If 
we can fix the doctrine, then we have to figure out what kind of public 
discourse we want intermediaries to foster. The excesses of Television Age 
homogeneity and Internet Age fragmentation, viewed together, commend 
the middle ground: a healthy balance between social cohesion and dynamic 
engagement. May the lessons of our past help guide us to a brighter future. 
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